This effect of the learning horizon has often been ignored in works with models similar to ours. For example, our model is nearly identical to that in the empirical work [6] , in which the authors show that polarized beliefs can arise when there are two types of bots with diametrically opposed viewpoints. However, the experiments in [6] simply fix a large learning horizon and do not consider the effect of varying it. Models similar to ours have also been treated analytically; for example, [5] , [7] , [8] study non-Bayesian learning models similar to ours. However, these works consider a fixed number of agents and an infinite learning horizon and thus also ignore timescale effects.
In our first set of results (see Section 3 of [3] ), we argue that the learning horizon plays a prominent role in the learning outcome and therefore should not be ignored. In particular, we show that the learning outcome depends on the relationship between the horizon T n and a quantity p n that describes the "density" of bots in the system, where both quantities may depend on the number of agents n. Mathematically, letting θ ∈ (0, 1) denote the true state, θ Tn (i * ) denote the belief about the true state for a uniformly random agent i * at the horizon T n , and P − → denote convergence in probability, we show (see Theorem 3.1 in [3] )
Here p n is smaller when more bots are present and 0 is the erroneous true state promoted by the bots. Hence, in words, (1) says the following: if there are sufficiently few bots, in the sense that T n (1−p n ) → 0, i * learns the true state; if there are sufficiently many bots, in the sense that T n (1−p n ) → ∞, i * adopts the extreme belief 0 promoted by the bots. We note the result in (1) assumes a particular generative model for the graph connecting agents and bots (a modification of the so-called directed configuration model). For such models, phase transitions -wherein small changes to model parameters lead to starkly different behaviors -are often observed. In this case, assuming T n and p n are related by T n = (1 − p n ) −k for some k > 0, and also assuming p n → 1, the learning outcome suddenly drops from θ to 0 as k changes from e.g. 0.99 to 1.01. Put differently, agents initially (at time (1 − p n ) −0.99 ) learn the true state, then suddenly (at time (1 − p n ) −1.01 ) "forget" the true state and adopt the extreme opinion 0. Hence, the chosen learning horizon can lead to drastically different outcomes.
In light of this phase transition, it is natural to set k = 1 and "zoom in" to study the dynamics of this sudden drop from θ to 0. Indeed, in Theorem 3.1 in [3] , we also show 
where η ∈ (0, 1) is a model parameter that dictates the weight agents place on other agents' opinions in their belief updates. Viewing the limit in (2) as a function of c offers an intuitive interpretation: if an adversary deploys bots in hopes of driving agent opinions to 0, the marginal benefit of deploying additional bots is smaller when c is larger (i.e. when more bots have been deployed). In other words, the adversary experiences diminishing returns.
Our second set of results (see Section 4 in [3] )) consider a setting in which an adversary deploys bots in hopes of disrupting learning. More specifically, the adversary chooses how many bots to connect to each agent (subject to a budget constraint), with the aim of minimizing θ Tn (i * ). In the absence of our first set of results, it is unclear how to even approach deriving the optimal adversary strategy. Hence, we leverage these results to formulate the adversary's problem as an integer programming problem: by (1) and (2), an adversary can minimize beliefs (at least asymptotically) by minimizing p n , viewed as a function of the number of bots connected to each agent.
Even after recasting the adversary's problem as an integer program, it remains unclear if it can be solved efficiently. Thus, we propose two solutions to this problem. First, we show its objective function belongs to a special class of discrete-domain functions that can be minimized in polynomial time, and we employ an existing algorithm to solve the integer program exactly. However, this runtime is n 2 even in the best case, which too high for social networks like Twitter and Facebook (where n is on the order of 10 8 ). Thus, we also propose a randomized approximation algorithm that runs in time n log n and that produces a constant-fraction approximation of the optimal 1 − p n with high probability (see Theorem 4.3 in [3])). Using this constant-fraction result, as well as our analysis from the first part of the paper, we (roughly) show the following: if the most sophisticated adversary can drive the typical belief to 0 (in the sense of (1)), then our randomized scheme will drive the typical belief to 0 as well. See Corollary 4.4 in [3] .
While the exact solution can only be found algorithmically, our randomized scheme has a somewhat interpretable, and quite interesting, form. In particular, it suggests that successful adversaries carefully balance agents' influence and susceptibility to influence. For a social network like Twitter, this means targeting users with many followers (i.e. influential users) who follow very few users themselves (so that fake news tweeted by bots will appear prominently in the targeted users' Twitter feeds). While this is somewhat intuitive, the precise form of the randomized scheme is far from obvious. Furthermore, empirical results show that our scheme disrupts learning to a larger degree than schemes that more obviously balance influence and susceptibility. Thus, we believe our analysis provides new insights into vulnerabilities of news sharing platforms and social learning.
Additionally, as alluded to above, we show empirically that our proposed adversary solutions outperform (in terms of minimizing θ Tn (i * )) a number of intuitive heuristics on graphs representing real social networks. This is somewhat remarkable, because our adversary solutions fundamentally assume that minimizing θ Tn (i * ) amounts to minimizing p n , and we only verify this assumption for a certain random graph model (and only in the limit as n grows to infinity). Thus, our empirical results suggest that our insights regarding vulnerabilities in news sharing and social learning extend beyond the random graph model at hand.
Finally, we note several of our results assume T n = O(log n), which guarantees that at the learning horizon, an agent's belief is only affected by a vanishing fraction of other agents and bots (at least in the sparse random graph model considered). This is why the title refers to the learning as "local". More specifically, our choice of T n is dominated by the mixing time of the random walk on this random graph. From a belief analysis perspective, this means we cannot leverage global properties like the stationary distribution of this walk, in contrast to many works on social learning (see Section 5 in [3] ). In fact, as shown in [9] , this random walk exhibits cutoff, meaning that at our learning horizon, the distribution of this walk can be maximally far from stationarity. Hence, we cannot even use an approximation of the stationary distribution. Instead, we leverage the fact that our random graph model has a well-behaved local structure, and we show that analyzing beliefs amounts to analyzing hitting probabilities. Fundamentally, it is from three regimes of these hitting probabilities that the three regimes in (1)-(2) arise (see Section 3.2 in [3] ).
